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4ABSTRACT
The financial crisis originated in the United States of America and
impacted the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC hereafter) countries after
a time lag.  The falling oil prices, contracting trade and declining private
investment flows have adversely affected the GDP growth of the Gulf
countries, which in turn affected the flow of migrant labour to and from
them and remittances from them.  In   this context this study seeks to:
Assess the impact of the recession on key industries in the GCC
economies;
Assess the repatriation of expatriate labourers;
Assess the flow of emigrant labourers and fall in remittances;
Assess the impact of loss of employment on the emigrant
households’ in the country of origin; and
Identify the measures undertaken by various stakeholders to
mitigate the adverse effects.
The study takes a two pronged approach to the subject.  The
impact of the global crisis on the GCC economies is first analyzed in
terms of the sectors of the economy affected, the changes in GDP growth
and employment of expatriate labourers.  A Survey of migrants in the
destination countries was carried out to assess the loss of employment
and earnings and their coping strategies. It was followed by surveys of
emigrants and return migrants in the countries of origin in South Asia.
Study teams visited the six GCC countries and Malaysia to interview
labourers as well as employers in various sectors.
The global crisis has affected the GCC economies through falling
oil prices, depressed property and equity prices, low investor confidence
and reversal of capital flows.  The GDP growth in GCC economies spawns
large population growth, especially large influx of migrant labourers
from South Asia. So a recession is expected to affect the flow of migrants
and remittances.
5The rising oil prices since 2002 brought about large scale FDI
flow into the GCC economies, rising investment rates and higher GDP
growth rates by boosting the investment in telecom, banking, power
and real estate.  Private investment flow played an important role in the
emergence of West Asia as the world’s largest market in project finance
surpassing Western Europe and North America.  The rapid growth of the
GCC economies in the 2000s initiated increasing concentration of
employment in manufacturing, construction and trade, and so attracted
a large influx of expatriate unskilled and semi skilled labourers.  One
estimate put the composition of Indian expatriates in UAE as 50 per cent
unskilled workers, 25 per cent semi-skilled and 25 per cent skilled
professionals.  The large influx of unskilled and semi-skilled workers
led to higher rent inflation on top of unprecedented food inflation,
attributed to global rise in food prices in the late 2000s.  Over a quarter
of the population in the GCC countries was spending above 20 per cent
of their disposable income on food then.  In response, the governments
raised the wages of the public sector employees. This might have
protected them, but vast segments of workers in manufacturing,
construction and trade suffered real income losses.
The precipitous fall of oil prices and the large losses suffered by
the Sovereign Wealth Funds of the GCC countries had dried up the FDI
inflow and credit flow into the Gulf; much worse, the banking sector
also was facing a severe crisis with few international banks willing to
lend to projects in GCC Countries.  The world export demand was not
expected to pick up immediately; and trade discriminatory measures
were increasing as protectionism was spreading globally in the face of
crisis.  Added to the adverse economic environment were the not too
transparent bank dealings in the Gulf, poor contract enforcement and
discriminatory property ownership regimes.  The silver lining was the
quick rebound of oil prices - current prices surpassed the January 2008
levels- and the improvement in the ‘doing business environment’ in the
Gulf countries.
6The construction boom in the GCC countries had come to a halt
with 20 to 30 per cent cancellations, the bulk of which was in Dubai and
trade volumes had declined.  The phenomenal growth in employment
of the past five or six years had come to a halt and about 40 per cent of
the workers had been affected.  Expatriate workers did not leave in large
numbers, but salary cuts were widespread; stoppage of increments,
benefits and perks was also reported.
As regards the impact of the crisis on the South Asian migrant
workers, the databases were poor and the numbers were hard to come by.
The numbers mentioned by Indian ministers ranged between 50,000
and 500,000.  An estimate of return migrants to Kerala arrived at by the
Centre for Development Studies, based on a revisit of the emigrants and
return emigrants of their 2008 Kerala Migration Survey, was around
61,000 for Kerala.  Applying the methodology of the Kerala Resurvey
to South Asia as a whole, the return emigrants from the Gulf were
estimated to be 264,000.  These estimates were far lower than the official
predictions because migrants somehow struggled to stay back and earn
to repay the debt incurred to pay for the cost of migration.  Hence, the
migrants’ loss of current employment did not lead to an immediate
return as they would be hunting for various alternatives in which social
support networks also played a part.  Thus, the number of migrants
returning would be lower than those losing jobs, the difference implying
that they were in search of employment in the destination countries.
The numbers of migrants from Kerala who lost jobs but continued to
stay in Gulf were estimated to be 39,000 and those who returned at
61,000; and for South Asia, the corresponding numbers were 170,000
and 264,000 respectively.
Despite the crisis and job loss, the demand for expatriate workers
continued in the Gulf as was evident from the outflows of migrant workers
from South Asia.  Except for a 35 per cent fall in numbers from India, the
flows in 2009 were comparable to those in 2008.  But the direction of
7flow had changed; UAE was attracting less number of labourers whereas
hardly any change was observed for Saudi Arabia.
Migrant workers sent home remittances which boosted the
economy.  India being one of the world’s top remittance recipients at
$52 billion (and China at $49 billion) in 2008, the policy makers were
worried that remittance flows might decline due to the crisis.  But
estimates showed that remittances had, in fact, increased by 3 to 25
percent in 2009 in the South Asian countries.  Micro level data on
remittances from households with an emigrant currently in Gulf confirm
the macro findings:  about 94 percent of the households reported
receiving regular remittances and about 30 percent receiving gifts during
the crisis period.  No change had been observed in the use of remittances
by those households in 2008-09 compared to normal times.  But the
survey showed that 13 per cent of the emigrants reported loss of job.
Nearly half of them had found another job, and a quarter were staying
illegally in the Gulf.  The work conditions had also changed due to the
crisis:  25 per cent of the emigrants reported redundancies, 16 per cent
reported postponement of contracts, 20 per cent reduction of wages, 17
per cent heavier workloads and 8 per cent were forced to take annual
leave and proceed home.
The survey among return emigrants in South Asia who had lost
their jobs showed that 73 per cent of them remained unemployed one
month after return; but their proportion had declined to 42 per cent at
the time of survey.   Among the employed, 37 per cent had managed to
find regular employment, 40 per cent casual employment and 8 per
cent, contract work.   The unemployed return emigrants survived on
past savings, borrowing, and support from family members.  And a few
had sold assets to meet expenses.
The governments of the countries of origin and destination have
taken a few steps to mitigate the hardships faced by the workers losing
jobs. The Government of Nepal has announced a plan to meet the cost of
8migration of those who returned after losing jobs. The Government of
Kerala state has announced a rehabilitation package for the Gulf
returnees. Some GCC countries have relaxed slightly the visa conditions,
allowing those who were thrown out of jobs to stay for longer periods in
their country making it possible for them to search for alternative
employment. The sponsorship condition has also been relaxed in some
cases. Some of these reforms in the GCC countries might not be directly
related to the crisis, because they were in the making for some time now
in the face of severe criticisms of the work and life conditions of the
expatriate workers in those countries even before the crisis struck them.
91. Introduction
The financial crisis had its origins in the United States of America
(USA) in 2008, and spread to Europe, particularly the United Kingdom,
and then to Japan.  It has now engulfed most economies – developed,
developing and emerging. However, the effect of the crisis has been
slow to manifest in the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries1
than in the European and US economies. Their basic strengths - a public
funded banking sector and huge trade surplus due to the export of oil,
the price of which saw unprecedented increase in a span of six months in
2008 - shielded the GCC economies from the adverse impact during the
initial days of the crisis. The large current account surpluses ranging
from 6.1 per cent of the GDP for Oman to 45 per cent for Kuwait also
helped (IMF, 2009a, 2009b). This, coupled with significant inward
foreign direct investments to all GCC countries, except Kuwait, also
had a beneficial impact (ESCWA, 2008).
However, there were indications from various sources that the
GCC economies began to feel the impact of global crisis since the last
quarter of 2008. The most significant indicator was the slowdown in the
GDP growth rate in 2008 and the predicted negative growth rate in 2009
in some of these economies (Gulftalent.com, 2009). The predicted decline
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in the growth rate in these economies was based on the first few months
of 2009 during which there was a continued decline in the oil prices2,
owing mainly to the decline in demand from the OECD countries. At the
time of writing this report, the crude oil price had almost reached the
level of the base line price of January 2008. Moreover, given the link
between the growth in the hydrocarbon-based sectors in the economy
and the non-hydrocarbon-based sectors, the decline in the price of oil
was expected to reduce the growth of the latter. In the financial sector,
the stock markets in all the GCC countries recorded a decline, owing to
the withdrawal of the foreign institutional investors. A number of private
funded domestic and international projects in the Gulf region had
reportedly been cancelled or abandoned, leading to a large number of
layoffs or retrenchment of the workforce. At the beginning of 2009, after
observing the downturn in GCC economies, several international
organizations showed interest in assessing the impact of the economic
crisis on industry and trade (Nanto, 2009) and some in particular, on
migration and remittances (Fix et al, 2009; Ibrahim, 2009; ILO, 2009;
World Bank, 2009).
Nevertheless, these effects cannot be generalized for all the GCC
countries given their diversity.  Countries that are more exposed to
global capital, investment and consumption demand face a greater
risk of being affected by the crisis than others. For instance, Dubai in
the UAE, which depend heavily on international capital, tourism and
real estate, seems to be more adversely affected than other countries.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, which has only 25 per cent foreign
workers compared to much higher proportions in the other GCC
economies might be much less affected than others (Zachariah and
Rajan, 2009). The crisis seems to have visibly hit the GCC economies
in the beginning of 2009.  However, both the depth and intensity of
crisis and the possibility of turnaround are not clear. Of course, the
longer it takes to reach a turnaround, the longer it would take to
overcome the crisis.
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Needless to say, the slowdown in the growth rates of GCC
economies will have particular significance for the South Asian expatriates
who are the main source of migrant labour in the GCC countries. This
would affect the flow of migration and cause unexpected large scale return
emigration and falling remittances (Kapiszewski, 2006).
2. Research Questions
In this context, for informed policy making in the countries of
origin (South Asia) and countries of destination (GCC countries), the
research issues to be investigated are as follows:
• How is the crisis going to affect the demand for South Asian
migrant workers in the Gulf countries?
• What strategies could the emigrants adopt to cope with the
situation at their place of work (countries of destination): what is
the likely impact of the crisis on the home country in terms of
decline in remittances, if any?
• Do countries in South Asia expect large-scale return emigration?
Do they expect a decline in the outflow of emigrant labour to
Gulf countries; and inward remittances from them?
• How do the strategies of the migrants to cope with the crisis in
the countries of destination affect the coping mechanisms of
their families in the home country, particularly those of the women
left behind?
• What actions could the South Asian countries - collectively or
independently- take to mitigate the hardships of the return
emigrants and their families?
3. Research Objectives
To seek answers for the above questions, this project formulated
the following objectives:
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• To assess the impact of the recession on key industries in the
GCC economies which employ a majority of migrant workers
from South Asia, and to examine the migrants’ strategies to cope
with the crisis.
• To assess the impact of the crisis on the extent of repatriation of
the migrants, decline in the flow of emigrants and fall in
remittances.
• To analyze the effect of the return of the migrants to their
respective households in their countries of origin.
• To study the changes in the characteristics of employment, savings
and livelihood diversification of affected households, if any; and
• To identify the key measures to be carried out by various
stakeholders, such as SAARC and the countries of origin and
destination.
4. Scope of Research3 and Study Teams
The scope of the present research is to critically assess the emerging
economic growth and employment trends in the context of the global
financial crisis in the countries of destination, particularly in the six
countries of the Gulf (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar,
Bahrain and Kuwait) and Malaysia. The scope also includes the impact
of the global financial crisis on stocks and flows of migrant workers and
inward remittances to the five countries of South Asia4 – India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
The study is a collaborative effort of Centre for Development
Studies, Thiruvananthapuram and the social sciences research institutes
within the South Asian region. Team members from Centre for
Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram and from among the social
sciences research institutes within the South Asian region as and the
destinations where they worked are presented below.
13
Countries of Team Members from the Centre for Development Studies
Destination
Malaysia S Irudaya Rajan,  Aparna Nair and M. Mansy
United Arab D Narayana, Vinoj Abraham, S Irudaya Rajan and
Emirates K C Zachariah
Saudi Arabia A V Jose, D Narayana, S Irudaya Rajan, Sabu Aliyar
and S. Sunitha
Qatar Udaya Sankar Mishra,   Hrushikesh Mallick
and S Irudaya Rajan
Bahrain K Navaneetham, Arindam Banerjee, V J Varghese and
S Irudaya Rajan
Oman P Mohanan Pillai, Arindam Banerjee and S Irudaya Rajan
Kuwait K Pushpangadan, Parameswaran.M  and S Irudaya Rajan
Countries of Institute Researchers
origin
India Centre for Development Studies, S Irudaya Rajan
Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala
Pakistan Pakistan Institute of Nasir Iqbal
Development Economics, Saima Nawaz
Islamabad, Pakistan
Bangladesh Bangladesh Institute of Anwara Begum
Development Studies, Dhaka,
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka Marga Institute, Colombo,
Sri Lanka Myrtle  Perera
Nepal Nepal Institute of Development
Studies, Kathmandu, Nepal Ganesh Gurung
5. Approach and Methodology
The first approach for the research is to assess the trends in relation
to expatriate workers, imports, exports, investment, inflation,
employment structure and other financial aspects and stimulus packages
announced by the respective governments in the seven countries of
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destination5.  They are to be based on the macro picture from the
published national and international sources of data and the discussions
of the same with the respective ministries and other stakeholders in the
Gulf. Then the researchers are expected to submit a destination country
report6. During their visit to the Gulf, the researchers are expected to
complete the emigrant survey questionnaires to assess the coping
mechanisms of migrants in the Gulf.
The second approach for the research is to map the trends and
patterns of international migration, preferred countries of destination
and trends in remittances over a long period of time. This approach also
attempts to assess the resilience of the outflow of migrant labour from
South Asia and inflow of remittances from around the globe, especially
from the Gulf region, in the context of the financial meltdown. These
objectives are attempted to be achieved by engaging a research institute
in the country of origin which works closely with the national
governments to carry out these tasks. The institutes involved7 are as
shown above.
In addition to the macro assessment of the situation in the five
countries of origin and the seven countries of destination, three surveys
were also undertaken in this study. The purpose of those surveys was to
obtain a micro level understanding of the coping strategies (a) of
emigrants in the countries of destination; (b) of the emigrant households
in the countries of destination and (c) of the return emigrants in the
countries of origin who lost their jobs in the countries of destination
due to the financial crisis.
5.1  Workers Survey8
350 workers in the seven countries of destination were surveyed
with the sample size limited to 50 workers in each country. Logistic
support of the Indian Embassies in the respective countries of destination
and migrant associations9 was obtained for the conduct of the survey.
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This survey was aimed at understanding the profile of migrant workers
and their respective households; employment conditions; emoluments;
working and living conditions; remittances, saving and investment at
the time of survey, six months before (at the time of the crisis) and a year
ago (before the onset of the crisis); adaptation to and coping mechanisms
by both the migrant workers in the countries of destination and their
families in the country of origin (see Appendix I for the worker survey
module).
5.2  Emigrant Household Survey10
This survey was conducted among the households which have at
least an emigrant currently in the Gulf to examine their coping
mechanism, if any, at the time of the crisis. The survey was canvassed
among 50 households each in four countries of South Asia – Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka – with the support of a research partner
in the respective countries. In India, CDS conducted the survey among
250 households in the five states of India selecting 50 each from the
states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Maharashtra and Punjab,
from where large-scale migration to Gulf takes place. The total number
of households that participated in the emigrant household survey in the
five countries of origin in South Asia was 450. The survey elicited
information on household details, profile of emigrants, household
economic assets, remittances and their utilisation, current employment
status of the emigrants and their coping mechanisms, economic impact
of the crisis in terms of household expenditure, financial commitment
and pattern of investment, change in the frequency of remittances,
adapting and coping mechanisms, psychological impact – stress and
anxiety, financial autonomy and health related issues (see Appendix II).
5.3 Return Emigrant Survey11
This survey was conducted among the emigrants who lost their
jobs and were forced to return home because of the financial crisis in the
Gulf. It was also aimed at examining their coping mechanism after their
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return to their home country. The survey was canvassed among 50 return
emigrants each in the four countries of South Asia – Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Nepal and Sri Lanka – with support from research partner institutions. In
India, the survey was canvassed among 250 return emigrants in five
states of India, selecting 50 each in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala,
Maharashtra and Punjab. Thus the total number of return emigrants
surveyed was 450 among the five countries of origin in South Asia.
However, we confess that it was difficult to locate the emigrants who
lost their jobs in the countries of destination and returned back to the
countries of origin. In the beginning of 2009, most countries in South
Asia expected that due to the crisis there would be large-scale return
emigration to their countries. Our small-scale survey of return emigrants
conducted in South Asia proved those forecasts unsubstantiated, as we
will see later in the report. The return emigrant survey collected
information on household details, the profile of return emigrants,
household economic assets, employment, remittances and their
utilisation, household expenditure pattern, reasons for return, adaptation
and coping mechanisms (see  Appendix III).
5.4  Return Migrant Resurvey, 200912
Return migration from the Gulf is the normal process of contract
migration. Migrants from South Asia go on contract work to the
destination countries; and once the contract ends, they, in the normal
course, return to the countries of their origin. As of now, we have no
estimate of return emigration from Gulf to South Asia.  However, the
Centre for Development Studies has completed four large-scale migration
surveys (1998, 2003, 2007 and 2008) over the last decade.  One of the
research objectives of this project is to assess the flow of forced return
emigration, or return emigrants before the expiry of contract from the
Gulf region to South Asia.  To assess both regular return migrants and
the crisis-led return emigrants from the Gulf, we revisited emigrant
households from the 15,000 households of the 2008 Kerala migration
survey. We estimated the extent of crisis led-return emigrants to Kerala
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after the revisit. In a later section of this paper we are applying the same
methodology and projecting the figures approximately to estimate the
number of return emigrants from the Gulf to South Asia. In addition, the
return migration resurvey 2009 also estimated the number of emigrants
who lost their jobs in the Gulf, but had chosen to remain there itself
without returning back to their counties of origin. This is new information
(‘lost job, but have not returned’) which will also be generated for South
Asia (see details of the above survey, working paper No. 432)
6. Analytical Framework
The financial crisis had its own impact on the destination countries.
It manifested differently on both employees and employers in the
respective countries of origin and destination.  For instance, some sectors
in the destination countries were seriously affected, and both expatriates
and nationals lost their jobs. Some expatriates chose to adjust to the
situation and decided to work on lower wages under harsh living
conditions, while the rest returned to their countries of origin; whereas
nationals of the destination countries declared themselves as
‘unemployed’. The unemployment among nationals instigated their
respective governments to respond by implementing strong regulation
in visa regimes and tightening the movement of labour from foreign
countries (what the Gulf countries call “demographic imbalance”).
Similarly, emigrant families in the countries of origin had to make several
adjustments to cope with the crisis (see Figure 1 for details). We shall
briefly explain some of the aspects below:
6.1 Demand for Migrant Labour
For the countries of South Asia, such as India, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan, which send their labour out, the repercussions
of the financial crisis in Gulf economies are a set of specific issues
relating to the flow of migrants to the Gulf, crisis led/forced return
emigration from Gulf to the home country and the possibility of declining
remittances to the home country. The demand for labour in a crisis-
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affected economy may be influenced by two kinds of effects.  The first is
the scale effect. - The scale effect is a change in the total demand for
labour in the economy owing to the change in total output of the economy.
The second is the substitution effect. It is the replacement of foreign
labour with local labour or other factors of production. In the current
scenario, the substitution may take place mainly in the form of local
workers replacing the migrant workers. This could occur because the
wage rates of the local workers might decline due to the slump in the
economy. This could also occur because of the pressure from the political
lobbies to employ local labour rather than migrant workers. However,
the scale effect and substitution effect may affect different industries
differently. The scale effect may be industry specific: all industries may
not face a decline in output, while some may face a crisis. For instance,
the scale effect of the crisis in UAE seems to be more concentrated
within the real estate and tourism segments. Also, those industries which
are in the value chains of affected industries, or which are intermediaries/
final outputs of other affected industries, could also be affected,
depending on the strength of the linkages.
6.2  Migrant Workers’ Strategies to Cope with the Crisis
In times of crisis, the migrant workers may adopt various strategies
to tide over the situation or to mitigate the risks. The most common
strategy adopted by the migrant workers would be to return to the home
country and find alternate employment. Among the rest, some may decide
to migrate to other destinations which are less affected by the crisis;
some may remain in the same destination country but move/shift to new
occupations/industries which are less affected by the crisis; and some
may decide to work in the same industry/occupation in the countries of
destination at a much lower wage rate and under less favourable
conditions of work.
Adding yet another dimension to the issue would be the reaction
of the local workers and local governments in the face of increasing
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unemployment in the local economy which may take the forms of
increasing stigma and persecution of foreign labour.  All the same, the
extent of return migration to the South Asian economies due to the crisis
is, at the moment, conjectural. An explicit understanding of the strategies
adopted by the migrants to meet the crisis alone would allow one to
draw correct conclusions about the size of return migration, re-migration,
attrition, mobility, work and poorer earnings.
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6.3 The Impact of the Migrant Workers’ Strategies on the Sending
Country
In the countries which send migrant workers out, the strategies to
cope with the crisis might get manifested mainly in three ways: there
could be an increase in the number of job seekers within the country; a
reduction in the remittances; and more importantly, changes in the
spending habits of the return migrants/emigrant families.
The home countries are already overburdened with shrinking jobs
due to the global crisis. Migrants returning home would mean that more
workers would be added into that economy. Estimates show that GDP
growth in South Asia decelerated in 2008, falling from 8.6 per cent in
2007 to below 7 per cent. It is projected to decline further to around 6
per cent or less in 2009, before recovering to around 7 per cent in 2010
(ADB, Various issues). One issue in this context would be to find
employment for the returning migrant workers when unemployment is
already on the increase. The overall effect of the global crisis on South
Asian economies has been less compared to developed economies.
Nevertheless, given the fact that the inherent capacity of such economies
is weak owing to their poor financial conditions and high level of poverty,
any decline in the growth rates would greatly diminish their ability to
cope with an influx of return migrants.
To assess the meaningful effect of crisis on migrant workers, sectoral
specificities of the destination countries of need to be understood as
well. The manufacturing and construction sectors are likely to be among
the severely affected sectors there. Many of the return migrant workers
might have been employed in such sectors in the destination countries,
and hence finding alternative employment would be a challenge for
them at the countries of origin, as those sectors are likely to be depressed
there also. Even if they are ready to switch roles as entrepreneurs/self
employed workers, as is the case usually with return migrants, in the
present circumstances, the possibilities of successful entrepreneurship
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require external support as well. The Finance Minister of the Government
of Kerala (Kerala has an estimated 2 million workers in the Gulf) has
announced a US$200 million entrepreneurship package for repatriates
in his budget speech in 2009. It is an indication of such support.
Similarly, the Government of Nepal has taken measures to compensate
Nepali migrant workers who have lost their jobs because of the global
recession.
Another significant way in which the crisis may affect the home
economy is through the fall in remittances. Studies predict that remittance
flows to South Asia will decline sharply from over 16 per cent growth in
2008 to zero per cent in 2009 (Ratha, Mohapatra and Xu, 2008). India is
the largest recipient of remittances in the world today; and a significant
share is contributed by the innumerable unskilled and semi-skilled
Indian workers abroad. Remittances also play a very important role in
the balance of payments position in all South Asian economies. A fall in
the number of migrants from the region, and the reduction in their wage
rates and poorer work conditions of continuing migrant workers may
reduce the flow of remittances to the home economy.
6.4  The Effect of the Crisis on the Migrant’s Family
As migrant workers are often the sole breadwinners of their families,
any lay off in the destination countries is likely to push these families
into poverty once again. The crisis may impose some changes in the
spending and investment habits of the migrant workers. While
repatriation would open the question of re-entry of the migrant in the
home labour market, the stoppage or reduction in the remittances would
necessitate changes in the spending and saving habits of their
households.  The sudden reduction in income may bring about
employment and livelihood diversification within the household, trigger
cutback in long gestation investments such as education and health
expenditure and push the younger members of the households
prematurely to enter the labour market.
22
6.5  The Effect of the Crisis on Migrant Women Workers and Women
Left Behind
In keeping with Islamic tradition, the GCC countries, in general,
do not encourage women to work.  The presence of native women workers
in the GCC workforce is marginal, and they constitute between 2-10 per
cent of the national workforce.  Because of the traditional policies
regarding the place of women in the workforce, occupational segregation
of women had been very strong in GCC countries. Most women workers
in the GCC countries are poor expatriates from South Asian economies
engaged as domestic help. According to some estimates, in the UAE, over
80 per cent of the employed women were expatriates, while in Bahrain the
proportion was 55 per cent. Expatriate women were between 10-25 per
cent of the total expatriate workforce (Kapiszewski, 2006).  Even during
normal times, it is recognized that migrant women domestic workers face
severe hardships including working for very low wages (Irudaya Rajan
and S. Sunitha 2010).  Women migrant workers are also excluded from
protection under labour laws because they are considered to be part of
the employing family and are outside the reach of those laws. These
difficulties may, in the context of the crisis, become more accentuated.
Similarly, women left behind in the home country face many
difficulties in managing their families. According to our estimates, Kerala
has one million married women whose husbands are migrants to the
Gulf ( Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan  2010a). They have to take steps to
effectively reorient the use of remittances, if they expect that the
remittances from their husbands are likely to decline due to the crisis.
7. Assessment of the Financial Crisis in the Gulf13
This section tries to trace the transmission links of the global
financial crisis to the employment and remittances of the South Asian
migrant workers to the GCC economies. The global crisis has affected
the gulf countries through its impact on export trade, finance and FDI.
The sectors which are severely affected are manufacturing, trade and
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construction, which also are the sectors employing the bulk of the
expatriate labour. The source for the number of expatriates affected and
the extent to which the volume of remittances fell is the size of the
economy and the policy of the GCC economies on migrant labour.
7.1  The Crisis and Growth
The US is at the epicenter of the global crisis facing severe
recession arising out of a squeeze on credit, sharp fall in housing and
equity prices, and high level of uncertainty. These shocks have depressed
consumption and have increased the saving rate. Equity prices are still
down and the exchange value of dollar has strengthened. Real GDP has
been contracting since the fourth quarter of 2008, and employment has
fallen rapidly since end 2007. Credit market is still remaining unsettled
despite the easing of policy rates. The economy is projected to contract
by 2.8 per cent  in 2009 and start recovering only by the middle of 2010.
The impact of the global crisis on Asian economies has been severe
despite their low exposure to US securitized assets, and their better
macroeconomic fundamentals. The group of advanced economies of
Asia - Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore - are expected to contract
by about 6 per cent  in 2009. Given their extreme exposure to external
demand, they will all suffer due to the contraction of the advanced
western markets. ASEAN - Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines,
and Vietnam - is also severely hit, especially Thailand and Malaysia which
are expected to contract in 2009 by 3 per cent  and 3.5 per cent  respectively.
Chinese growth is expected to come down from 13 per cent  in 2007 to
about 6.5  per cent  in 2009.  Indian growth is expected to decline from
over 9 per cent  in 2007 to 4.5 per cent  in 2009.
The global crisis has affected the Middle East through a large fall
in price of oil, reversal of capital inflows, depression of property and
equity markets, and losses in sovereign wealth funds. The effect of global
crisis is expected to vary across the countries depending upon country
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characteristics, such as high share of oil exports in total exports; large
quantum of re-exports, sizeable share of services in GDP, especially
transportation, trade, hotel and restaurants (Table 1). “In the region as a
whole, growth is projected to decline from 6 per cent in 2008 to 2.5 per cent
in 2009… Among the oil producing countries, the sharpest slowdown is
expected in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where the exit of external
funds… has contributed to a large contraction in liquidity, a sizeable fall in
property and equity prices, and substantial pressure in the banking system…
At the other end of the spectrum is Qatar, which is projected to grow by 18
per cent in 2009(up from 16.5 per cent in 2008), since its production of
natural gas is expected to double this year.” (IMF, 2009, p. 91).
The crisis affects expatriate labour through its adverse impact on
GDP growth and employment opportunities in the Gulf.
7.2 Gulf Economies: Population and GDP Growth
The population of the GCC countries has increased by 8.39 million
between 2000 and 2009, an increase which is almost the size of GCC
excluding Saudi Arabia in 2000. Over half of this increase is contributed
by Saudi Arabia, the country accounting for about 70% of the population
of GCC. However, the rate of increase has been low in Saudi Arabia and
high in Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait. Thus, two groups of countries may
be identified in the Gulf, one with an increase in population of about
20% between 2000 and 2009 and another with increases of three to four
times that (Table 2).
The large increase in populations of the Gulf countries is spawned
by the high average growth of GDP between 2000 and 2009. Qatar’s close
to doubling of the population between 2000 and 2009 has come along
with an average annual GDP percentage increase of over 11 per cent
during this period. The UAE has grown at close to 8 per cent  per annum.
Only Kuwait show exhibits a large increase in population with a
relatively low increase in GDP. Thus, the large increase in population
and the large migration of labour has come about with a high GDP growth.
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Short run GDP growth in GCC countries should ideally be
translated into population growth through migration as most of them
are heavily dependent on expatriate labour. However, such translation
is not simple and proportional as it is mediated through the government
effort to employ nationals in the different economic sectors. The high
share of nationals in the total employment in countries like Bahrain,
Oman and Saudi Arabia despite smaller overall population increases in
those countries indicates this.
7.3  Migration as a Component of Economic Growth
Countries like Oman and Bahrain, which have relatively less oil
revenues, have begun to employ their nationals more and more in the
work force. So, between 2000 and 2004, 134,000 expatriates were laid
off in Oman. The government had banned employment of expatriates in
certain sectors, like selling and transporting fruits and vegetables.
Bahrain too follows similar policies. For instance, in the construction
sector, a mandatory 25 percent Bahrainization had been in effect for
some years, which was brought down to 15 percent later. Saudi Arabia
Table 2.  Growth of population and GDP in GCC countries.
Country Population (Million) GDP Growth
2000-08 (%)
2000 2009 Increase Increase (%)
Kuwait 2.217 3.443 1.226 55.30 6.68
Qatar 0.606 1.098 0.492 81.19 11.17
Saudi Arabia 20.474 24.897 4.423 21.60 3.91
UAE 2.995 4.764 1.769 59.07 7.74
Bahrain 0.670 0.779 0.109 16.27 6.29
Oman 2.402 2.769 0.367 15.28 5.36
Total 29.364 37.750 8.386 28.56 -
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009.
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Table 3:  Profile of Expatriates in the Gulf, 2009
Country Population %
 (,000) Expatriates % of South % of
 to total Asian Expatriates
population   Expatriates  in the labor
to total  force
expatriates
Kuwait 3443 68.8 52.8 83.9
Qatar 1098 86.5 68.4 92.5
Saudi Arabia 24897 27.8 54.9 55.8
United Arab
Emirates 4764 81.0 68.7 89.8
Bahrain 779 43.0 95.1 58.3
Oman 2769 28.4 89.0 64.3
GCC 37750 40.3 61.8 -
Sources: Compiled from various sources such as ‘Country Reports’
prepared by the CDS team,
Reported figures by the respective Embassies in the Gulf and
the following four publications:
(a) United Nations. 2009. International Migration 2009.
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population
Division, New York.
(b) Kapiszewski, Andrzej (2006) “Arab versus Asian migrant workers
In the GCC countries”, UN Expert Group Meeting on
International Migration and Development in the Arab region,
UN/POP/EGM/2006/02
(c) Taattolo, Givonni (2006), Arab Labor Migration to The GCC
States, Project on Arab Labour Migration.
(d) Shah, Nasra. M (2009) Trends and Policies for Contract
Worker Mobility of Asian to the Gulf Cooperation Council
Countries, Paper for presentation at the 2009 IUSSP
conference in Marrakech, Morocco, September 27-October
2, 2009, Session 603 on “International Migration”
(organized by Ayman Zohry)
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too is no exception. In 2003, the government decided to reduce its
expatriate workforce by more than half within 10 years. It announced a
20 percent ceiling on the number of expatriate workers and their
dependents in the Kingdom; and issued a directive that workers from a
single country should account for no more than 10 percent of the
workforce by 2013. Further, about 54 job sectors have been reserved
exclusively for nationals. The nationalization drive is not so intense in
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.
As a result of migration policies, rates of population increases and
also distinct population composition of the countries in the Gulf vary
(details see Zakir Hussain 2010).  In Qatar and UAE expatriates constitute
over 80 per cent of the total population, and in Kuwait they account for
close to 70 per cent of the total population. While in Saudi Arabia and
Oman, expatriates constitute slightly over a quarter of the population,
Bahrain has over 40 per cent non- nationals in the total population. The
proportion of expatriates in the labour force moves with the proportion
in the population. Over 60 per cent of the expatriates are from South
Asia and in some countries, such as Oman and Bahrain, they account for
over 90 per cent of the expatriates (Table 3).
7.4  Investment and Growth
GDP growth goes along with investment and the Gulf is no
exception to it. While Qatar with 33 per cent investment rate reports a
GDP growth of close to 12 per cent, the UAE with investment rate of 23
per cent recorded a growth of close to 8 per cent. Rest of the countries
invests between 16 per cent and 20 per cent of their GDP and show lower
growth rates (Table 4).
When countries do not run a current account deficit and have
resources to invest in the domestic economy, why do they not push up the
investment rate and growth rate? It seems to be a question of strategy
given the fluctuating oil prices and the experience of the 1970’s. The high
oil prices of the 1970’s and the investment of the surpluses in US Treasury
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Bills helped countries like Saudi Arabia to carry on through the difficult
period of the 1980’s and 1990’s when oil prices remained low.
The previous price spike also witnessed massive investment in
physical and social infrastructure which yielded poor returns. The
bloated, highly subsidized and inefficient public sector yielded poor
growth. USA was the destination for most of the external investment. The
steady increase of the price of oil since 2002 has resulted in the Gulf States
reaping an incredible windfall of at least $ 1.5 trillion between 2002 and
2006 (Maloney 2009, P.129). Compared to the earlier price spikes, the
recent windfalls display altogether different trends. Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait reduced their external debt by more than half by 2005 (Smith,
2008, p.37). They continued to base their budgets around revenue
expectations of $ 25 per barrel, raising it only after a considerable time lag
when the price band had become obsolete. Many of the larger Gulf States
have invested in large projects within their countries. For example, Saudi
Arabia has invested about $ 200 billion in new ‘economic cities’ to generate
large-scale employment. Together the GCC countries have approximately
$ 1 trillion in infrastructure investments in the pipeline, in power generation,
water desalination, education and housing (Maloney, 2009, p.134).
Table 4. Growth of GDP, Investment and Current Account in the Gulf
Country  GDP Growth Investment Current Account Balance
 2000-08 (%) Rate, (% GDP)
 2000-08 2000-03 2004-08
average
 (% GDP)
Kuwait 6.68 16 23.43 36.33
Qatar 11.17 33 24.44 30.01
Saudi Arabia 3.91 20 8.02 26.27
UAE 7.74 23 10.07 16.31
Bahrain 6.29 19 3.704 11.08
Oman 5.36 16 8.95 8.34
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, 2009.
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The rising oil prices and booming investments in the oil and other
sectors have seen increased flow of foreign direct investment (FDI); a
ten fold increase in the region’s proportion of global FDI is witnessed
between 2001 and 2006. The region’s share in total FDI flows into the
developing world rose from a paltry 3% in 2002 to 15% in 2008. The
flow is led by large increases in FDI into Saudi Arabia, Turkey and UAE.
They accounted for 75% of cumulated inflows during 2003-2007
(UNCTAD, 2009, p.57). The increased flow of FDI into the Gulf boosted
the investment rate in these economies as is evident from the share of
FDI in gross capital formation (Table. 5).
Table  5. FDI flows and stocks in relation to investment and GDP in
the GCC economies
Country FDI inflow as a FDI stock as a
percentage of gross  percentage of GDP
 capital formation
2006 2007 2008 1990 2000 2008
Kuwait 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.6 0.6
Qatar 19.2 24.2 25.6 0.9 10.8 21.6
Saudi  Arabia 29.4 31.8 46.1 18.8 9.3 24.4
UAE 38.9 37.2 24.9 2.2 1.5 26.7
Bahrain 74.4 40.1 35.6 12.8 73.6 69.9
Oman 18.9 24.6 17.7 14.7 13.2 22.8
West Asia 23.3 22.1 21.8 10.2 9.7 18.0
Source: UNCT\AD, 2009
FDI inflow into the Gulf had increased rapidly and Gulf held
foreign assets have more than doubled since 2003 to between $ 1.8
trillion and $2.4 trillion (Maloney, 2009, p.135). Intra-Arab investments
tripled between 2000 and 2005.  About 11% of Gulf foreign investment
since 2002 is remaining within the region. Growing relationships with
Asia have seen greater flow of Gulf FDI into Asia. Since 2002, eleven
percent of Gulf investment has gone to Asia, which is expected to double
by 2020 (Maloney, 2009, p.136)
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FDI in services has become more prominent in recent years. While
telecom, banking, power, water and real estate has attracted a large amount
of foreign investment, the ongoing crisis dried up credit in a number of
infrastructure, residential-commercial and tourism related real estate projects.
The private sector played an important role in the emergence of West Asia as
the world’s largest market in project finance, surpassing Western Europe
and North America. The first nine months of 2008 saw nearly $ 40 billion in
project debt raised for developments in West Asia and North Africa compared
to $ 32 billion in Western Europe and $ 29 billion in North America
(UNCTAD, 2009, p.60). The deepening global financial crisis dried up this
source of project finance which affected project prospects and forced
governments to increase direct public funding of projects.
Table 6.  Estimated gains and losses of Gulf Sovereign Wealth funds
(Billion Dollars)
Agency Value Changes in value Value Loss on
Dec Capital Net  Dec  Dec
2007  gain/loss inflows 2008  2007
portfolio
 (%)
Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority (ADID),
Abu Dhabi Investment
Council (ADIC) 453 -183 59 328 -40
Qatar Investment
Authority (QIA) 65 -27 28 58 -41
Kuwait Investment
Authority (KIA) 262 -94 57 228 -36
Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency
(SAMA) 385 -46 162 501 -12
Other GCC 116 0 -33 84 0
GCC Total 1282 -350 273 1200 -27
Source: UNCTAD, 2009.
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A further dimension of the financial crisis is the losses suffered by
the Sovereign Wealth Funds of the GCC countries.  The surplus oil
revenues of the GCC countries flew into US Treasury Bills since the
1970s. These savings helped them fund expansions in the 1980s and
1990s when oil prices fell and deficits rose. In the late 1990s, SWFs
started investing in riskier assets abroad, such as stocks and real estate.
The rising oil prices in the 2000s saw this trend gain in strength. Recent
years saw them investing in industries such as energy, automotives,
aerospace, real estate and technology and helped reap the benefit in a
rising market. UAE had taken the lead in such investments. However, the
recent collapse of the real estate and equity markets generated large
losses for SWFs (Table 6).
The ongoing financial crisis would probably cause a further drop in
international trade and revenue resources and might tighten credit markets
for new projects. While outward flow might not fall as assets could be
obtained at discount prices, inward flow would be affected for the time
being, which might adversely affect economic activity in the GCC countries.
7.5  Employment Structure in the GCC Countries
In terms of value added by sectors, the structure of the GCC
economies is loaded heavily in favour of the oil sector ever since the oil
price spike in the mid- 1970s. The evolving structure of employment
reflects the growth trajectory followed by these countries. Early on a
sizable proportion of the oil revenues were set apart for building essential
services such as health, education, transport, power and water. The
resulting gains in human development indicators of the GCC countries
over the last three decades have been creditable. Infant mortality rates
which ranged between 41 (for Kuwait) and 110 (for Oman) among the
GCC countries in 1970-74 have fallen to between 9 (for UAE) and 23
(for Saudi Arabia) in 2000-04. Literacy rates have risen above 70% by
2000 and Human Development Indices ranged between 0.770 (Oman)
and 0.843 (Bahrain) in 2002 (Tabutin and Schoumaker, 2005).
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To start with, the workers in the service sectors were largely
expatriates. Over a period of time, preferred employment of nationals to
the workforce is changing its composition. But even in a country like
Saudi Arabia, which is in the forefront preferred employment of nationals,
except for the government sector (over 90% Saudi workforce), petroleum,
electricity & gas and banking (around 50% Saudi workforce),there are
other sectors like health sector which still has over 90% non- Saudi
workforce14. The rapidly growing sectors like construction, trade and
manufacturing, which employ the bulk of the workforce is largely
dominated by the expatriates. And the pattern is not very different in the
other GCC countries.
In the GCC countries, over 50% of the workforce is employed in
manufacturing, trade and construction. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are the
exceptions, where the share of public administration and defence is
rather high (Table 7). The share of construction in total employment
increased very fast during 2001-08 in some of the GCC countries.  For
instance, in UAE the share of construction sector employment increased
by five percent points during the period. In Saudi Arabia, the increase in
employment in the construction sector during the period was of the
order of 300,000.
7.6 Inflation and Wages
As already indicated, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait have high shares
of expatriates; even in Oman and Saudi Arabia, they make up 20 to 30
percent of the total population. About 75 percent of the UAE labour
force is from Asia; and Indian workers constitute 42.5 percent of the
population. Indian embassy estimates that, “50 percent of the 1.8 million
Indian expatriates in the UAE are unskilled workers, 25 percent semi -
skilled and 25 percent skilled professionals” (Woertz et al, 2008, p.20).
As all the unskilled and a large proportion of the semi- skilled workers
are housed in labour camps, and their rent, water and electricity charges
are borne by their employers, the major outgo from their wages is towards
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the expenses on food. The food expense as a percentage of disposable
income does not show much variation across the GCC economies.  For
over a quarter of the population, food expenses eats up over one- fifth of
their income, and only less than a quarter of the population spends less
than 10% of their income on food (Table. 8).  In the UAE, rent component
for some segments of workers is also fairly large - 21 to 50 % of the
disposable income.
Table 8. Distribution of population by percentage of disposable
income spent on food in the Gulf
Percentage of population
Percentage Kuwait Qatar Saudi UAE Bahrain Oman
spent on food Arabia
Less than 10% 14 24 22 24 22 13
10-20% 46 43 38 44 39 40
Above 20% 29 18 26 20 23 35
Don’t know 11 15 13 13 16 10
Source: Woertz et al, 2008.
Table 9. Inflation in GCC countries 2002-07 (%)
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Kuwait 0.5 1.2 1.3 4.3 3.3 6.6
Qatar 0.2 2.2 6.8 8.8 11.8 12.8
Saudi Arabia 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.7 2.2 6.5
UAE 2.9 3.1 5.1 7.1 11.3 11.6
Bahrain -0.5 1.7 2.3 2.6 2.1 8.4
Oman -0.7 -0.3 0.9 1.9 3.1 5.3
World 3.7 3.2 3.9 3.6 3.5 4.2
Source: Woertz et al, 2008.
Food inflation which was non-existent in the GCC countries until
2002 has developed into a serious problem in the Gulf post- 2005.  The
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UAE and Qatar were particularly affected. A major part of the inflation
could be attributed to the global rise in food prices- Food Price Index of
the FAO rose 57% between March 2007 and March 2008. This was on
top of an increase of 23% from 2006. The GCC countries responded to
the unprecedented inflation by rising subsidies, allowances, public sector
wage increases, and caps on rents. In the UAE, the governments of Abu
Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah announced a pay hike of 70 percent to all
public sector workers. However, it is not clear to what extent these
measures had protected the expatriate workers. The crisis has only added
to the afflictions of the expatriate workers.
7.7  Crude Oil Prices and Volumes
After the phenomenal increase in crude oil prices in the mid-
1970’s and early 1980’s which touched almost 30 USD per barrel in the
early 1980’s, nominal prices ruled below 20 USD for over one and a half
decades till 1999 (Table 10). Since 2000, crude oil prices began rising
steadily and by 2004 they had crossed 35 USD per barrel, reaching 50
USD in 2005 and going above 100 USD on average by mid- 2008. “Oil
prices have roller- coastered: starting 2008 at US $ 92/b, the OPEC
Reference Basket rose to a record US $ 141/b in early July before falling
to US $ 33/b by the end of the year, the lowest level since summer 2004.”
(http://www.opec.org/library/worldoiloutlook/pdf/woo2009.pdf
accessed on 26 September, 2009)
Crude oil prices ranged between USD 40-45 during January to
March 2009, and began rising since April 2009, crossed the USD 65
mark by June 2009, (that is, the price level of 2006) and to over USD 70
by September 2009. As is evident, the rise in price above USD 70 was
confined to about 15 months since June 2007 and the fall in price below
USD 50 for about four months since December 2008 (Figure 2). The
nominal price, however, is projected to stay in the range USD 70-100/b
during 2009-30, which seems to have come true already. Thus, leaving
aside the turbulent year of 2008, oil prices, which more than doubled
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Table 10.  Crude oil price and volume
Year (5 year Nominal price Nominal price Nominal price
average  (dollar per barrel)  adjusted for adjusted for
centered)  inflation  inflation and
exchange rate
1976 11.63 8.30 8.65
1983 29.83 11.23 15.15
1990 18.17 4.79 5.38
1997 17.12 3.58 4.39
2000 27.60 5.42 7.93
2001 23.12 4.44 6.70
2002 24.36 4.58 6.65
2003 28.10 5.17 6.53
2004 36.05 6.49 7.57
2005 50.64 8.91 10.40
2006 61.08 10.50 12.20
2007 69.08 11.59 12.62
2008 94.45 15.33 15.99
Source:  www.opec.org/library/AnnualStatisticalBulletin/PDF/
ASB2008.pdf accessed on 26 September 2009.
both in nominal and real terms between 2003 and 2006, are projected to
remain at that level over the period, 2009-30.
The demand for oil is said to grow in the medium term despite a
marginal fall in OECD demand: “OECD demand falls from 47.5 mb/d in
2008 to 45.5 mb/d by 2010, and remains at that level to 2013” (world
oil outlook). Almost 80 % of the net growth in oil demand from 2008-
2030 is in developing Asia, and as Asia is set to grow at moderate rates,
the overall oil demand is not expected to be adversely affected to any
great extent. The lower than expected growth in oil demand needs to be
viewed in the context of the buoyant demand realized over the period
2003-08.
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Crude oil production in the Gulf countries has not shown any
corresponding fluctuations to the variations in oil prices. Saudi Arabia has
been producing about 8 million barrels/ day since 1991 which has risen
beyond 9 million b/day since 2005. UAE has been producing over two million
barrels a day since 1991 which has crossed 2.5 million barrels by 2006. Qatar
has been producing about 400 thousand barrels a day since 1990, 600 thousand
barrels per day by 1998 and 800 thousand barrels by 2006.
Overall, oil revenues of the six nations under study are expected
to remain high in the medium term. Prices are projected to remain at the
levels reached by 2006, which are over twice the levels of 2003. While
demand for oil may not grow at the rates seen during the last three or
four years, it is not expected to fall to any great extent either. The net
result of the two processes is expected to generate moderately high
levels of oil revenues for the oil exporting countries of the Gulf.
7.8  Growth Prospects
The immediate growth prospects in GCC countries may be viewed
in the context of the fall in oil prices, a deepening of the global economic
downturn, an increase in financial instability and a rise in protectionism.
Source: www.opec.org/library/AnnualStatisticalBulletin/PDF/
ASB2008.pdf accessed on 20 November 2009.
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The fall in oil prices and worsening outlook for the world economy
since the third quarter of 2008 have hit investments hard in development
projects of GCC countries. The number of international banks willing
to lend to projects in GCC countries has come down to 12 at the end of
2008 from 45 in 2006 hitting major oil and gas, industrial and
infrastructural projects that have substantial amount of FDI. The
deepening global financial crisis has dried up project finance, led
developers to reappraise projects in the light of falling demand and
worsening outlook for credit markets. This has put pressure on
governments to increase funding.
Domestic investments in the Gulf backed by larger FDI flows
during 2003 and 2007 had surged. The global financial crisis had a
dampening effect on FDI. Global inflows in 2008 fell by 14% to $ 1697
billion from a record high of $ 1979 billion in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2009,
p.1). The negative impact on FDI has been through access to finance
affecting the capacity to invest and also through lower propensity to
invest owing to gloomy economic and market prospects. The crisis has
adversely affected Mergers & Acquisitions as equity and debt financing
has become difficult in the face of falling stock market values and
tightening credit conditions. Leveraged buyouts involving private equity
funds or hedge funds have also dried up. This is further accentuated by
the largest fall in FDI in finance (UNCTAD, 2009, Box I.3)
The export demand for the output from GCC would depend on
the growth of demand in the rest of the world and the access to those
markets. The growth of demand in the rest of the world is expected to be
weak owing to rising unemployment, weak consumer and investor
confidence and unsettled financial sector. About a quarter of the total
exports of the oil exporting countries15 of the Middle East are to North
America and the European Union. This segment would not show much
of a growth in 2010 and 2011. But the bulk of the trade to Asia (over
50% the total) would not suffer such serious fall as South Asian and
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Chinese growth is expected to be robust and ideally the GCC countries
should be benefitting from it.
But what has come in the way of the GCC countries benefitting
from it is the state measures by foreign countries increasing protectionism
which would have an adverse impact on trade: “… while middle Eastern
countries are faced with 204 trade discriminatory measures implemented,
or about to be implemented, by countries across the world, trade liberalizing
measures affecting the region number only 36” (Pradhan, 2009, p.191).
UAE faced the highest number of discriminatory trade measures followed
by Saudi Arabia. Thus, the GCC countries are likely to face daunting
challenges in their international trade activities during the current crisis.
7.9  Construction/ Projects
As is evident, project finance and utilities have also taken a severe
beating along with finance institutions in the current crisis. A recent
survey of projects (worth at least $10 million) reported 10 to 30%
cancellations or orders to put on hold in the GCC countries. Dubai,
which has about 60% of all projects in the GCC, has taken the largest
hit, which in turn has affected the GCC as a whole.
Table 11. Projects affected by the crisis in the Gulf
Country Projects andFinances involved
Projects under Projects Total %
 construction  cancelled/ project worth  Cancellation
on hold (billion $)*
Kuwait 90 18 114 17
Qatar 124 7 42 -
Saudi Arabia 442 106 387 19
UAE 1372 566 900 29
Bahrain 148 54 36 27
Oman 95 8 38 8
Source: Proleads.
Note: *All projects including cancelled/on hold.
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Interestingly, the crisis has affected all subsectors - from
commercial projects to residential properties - as the illustration from
UAE would show (Table 12).
Table 12. Projects affected by subsectors, UAE.
Subsector Projects under Total number %
construction of projects Cancellation
Commercial projects 340 487 147 (30)
Hospitality business 288 406 118 (29)
Residential properties 495 712 217 (30)
Retail projects 249 333 84 (25)
Total 1372 1938 566
Source:(http://www.gulfbase.com/site/interface/News Archive Details.
aspx? n=110724)
While new project starts have come down in the UAE, there is
continuing high level activity in ongoing projects that would be “the
envy of many” elsewhere in the world. There is evidence of increased
construction activity in Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Ajman. Thus, while
new starts have come down and those about to be started have been put
on hold, lot of activity is continuing in ongoing projects.
7.10   Gulf Crisis and South Asian Labour: The Links
GCC countries are largely oil exporters and the quadrupling of
oil prices during 2000-2008 brought windfall gains to them - estimated
to be over $2 trillion. The rising oil prices, the large savings and better
credit ratings of the GCC countries attracted large FDI inflows into the
Gulf boosting investments and growth. Apart from the oil sector, other
sectors such as tourism, trade, telecom, banking, power, and real estate
have attracted massive private investments. Infrastructure development
has been led by massive public investments in the Gulf. As a result of
these investments, there is commensurate GDP growth in the GCC
economies. This growth has got translated into expatriate population
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increases, subject only to the policy on expatriate labour of the countries,
with the bulk of the labour flowing from South Asia.
Countries with few restrictions on the number and origin of
migrant labourers, such as Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar, experienced 60 to
80 % increase in their populations during the first ten years of 2000s,
and those with explicit policies of showing preference for nationals in
employment, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain experienced
just about 20% increase in their populations. Despite a restrictive
migration policy, the number of migrants entering Saudi Arabia during
2000-2008 was more than those entering the rest of the five GCC
countries put together. Except in Kuwait, in the rest of GCC countries,
over 70% of the expatriate labourers are being employed in  just four
sectors, namely agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and trade;
whereas in Kuwait about a quarter of the total employment is in
domestic services. The spike in global food price and the rapid rise in
employment have led to rising inflation and a squeeze on real wages
in the GCC economies.
The global crisis reached the Gulf with a time lag, as the oil prices
reached record heights in early 2008 before falling precipitously.
Commodity prices, real estate prices and equity prices too fell. Along
with the falling commodity and asset prices, FDI inflows into the Gulf
began to be adversely affected, which in turn impacted investments in
key sectors. The large losses incurred by the SWFs and mortgage defaults
further eroded investor confidence. Growth of manufacturing, trade,
tourism and construction, which are all major sectors of employment
growth, began to be adversely affected depressing expatriate
employment. However, the impact of the crisis on GDP growth has varied
across the GCC economies with Qatar, Oman and Bahrain continuing to
show positive growth; and the other three economies showing mild
contraction, around 1% in 2009; even these economies are expected to
turn to positive growth in 2010.
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The quick rebound of oil prices by mid – 2009 and the not too
depressing current account and budget balances have made the
governments of the GCC countries bolder and induced them to continue
major infrastructure investments. The interventions in the banking sectors
have also been decisive. A further boost has been the, albeit lower, but
healthy GDP growth in the whole of South Asia in 2009 and the forecast
of higher growth rates in 2010. South Asia and China have emerged as
the major trading partners of GCC economies and the trade outlook
does not look very depressing. However, the continuing adverse factors
have been the depressed real estate and equity prices in the GCC
countries.
Overall, large scale retrenchment of expatriate labour in the GCC
economies did not take place due to the not too depressing GDP growth
and encouraging economic outlook. Rather, the large infrastructure
projects and public investments in some countries on the strength of
rising oil prices have begun attracting new flow of labour, albeit at a
slightly lower rate. The adjustment mechanisms of expatriate labourers
to the layoffs caused by the crisis   have been salary cuts, forced leave
and delayed renewal of work contracts. Hence, the expected large return
flow of labour to South Asia has not happened.
7.11  Crisis, Employment and Wages
The crisis had affected a large number of workers in some way or
the other (An estimate puts that nearly 40 percent of the workers have
been affected16). The effect varied across different industries, across
various occupations, across various skill levels and also depended on
the number of years of experience of the expatriate. The strategies
adopted by the workers to cope with the crisis were also varied. Contrary
to the general expectation, the impression from the field visit was that
expatriate workers did not leave the countries of their destination in
large numbers. However, workers in some construction companies such
as the ‘Arabtec Construction Company’ in Dubai had to leave the country
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because the company was severely affected in the crisis. In the normal
course, in most cases the construction companies would provide the
workers with the basic minimum facilities including food and
accommodation. Hence, for the less skilled workers in construction sector
which retained the workforce, the effect of the crisis was not as severe.
However, when the company faced sickness or closure, these workers
had no choice of staying back in the country.
The most rampant effect of the crisis was the cut in salary, stoppage
of increments, and stoppage of benefits and perks which the expatriates
had to suffer. Almost all workers interviewed reported suffering in the
recent past one of the above mentioned effects in their work life. The
effect of this phenomenon was more severe in case of middle income
group workers engaged in semi skilled and skilled jobs, since they have
to make their own arrangements for accommodation and food. Salary
cuts ranged from 10 to 30 percent of the salary levels prevailing in 2007
just before the crisis. However, it is to be kept in mind that prior to the
crisis there had been a large rise in the salaries and wages due to the
boom in the sector. Hence the decline in wages is a relative decline
compared to the boom wage levels in 2007. Yet the effect of this cut
cannot be trivialized. This is so because the boom had also lifted the
expectations of most workers leading to a high spending life style.
Many workers stated that the rise in wages during the boom period
induced them to borrow large loans for various purposes. The crisis
alternatively led to a situation wherein most workers were in debt traps
since their repayment capacity had fallen. And these traps precisely
acted as a lock in for workers, who could not leave the country even if
they wanted to.
At the level of highly skilled workers and managerial class, the
effect of the crisis had been curiously positive for the South Asian
workers. Most positions at the senior managerial levels were held by
European expatriates who claimed large salary packages. Many
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companies decided to lay off their European workers and replaced them
with South Asian workers who needed to be paid much less. However,
results from a survey among workers in UAE showed that almost all
workers perceived the crisis as a potential threat to their jobs and so, the
level of insecurity felt by them was very high.
8.   Impact of the Crisis on South Asian Migrant Workers
This section is devoted to an assessment of the impact of the
crisis: on the South Asian migrant workers in terms of return emigration;
flows of labour emigration from Asia to the Gulf; and, inward remittances
to South Asia. The assessment is based on the summary results of the
emigrant household surveys and survey of return emigrants carried out
to understand the coping mechanisms of individuals and families in
times of crisis.
8.1  Return Migration to South Asia from the Gulf, 2009
All agencies working on migration and remittances in the South
Asian countries and the Gulf region predicted an exodus of return
emigrants from the Gulf to their countries of origin.  But we still do not
have firm estimates of the number of return emigrants due to the financial
crisis from the Gulf to South Asia. Gulf migrants are basically workers
who emigrated for work on a contractual basis and they are supposed to
return to the country of origin once the contract period is over. So, return
migration17  is not a new phenomenon among South Asian workers in
the Gulf. Concerned officials in the countries of South Asia have
predicted the possible increase in number of return migrants to their
respective places of origin following the impact of the crisis in Gulf.  For
instance, Mr. Vayalar Ravi, Minister of Overseas Indian Affairs,
Government of India, informed the Parliament that accurate figures on
the return of Indian workers are not available. “It is estimated that about
50,000 to 150,000 workers have returned to India as a result of the delay
in execution of projects due to the economic slowdown and recession,”
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said he in a written statement. Mr. T.M. Thomas Isaac, Finance Minister
of Kerala18  State, India, informed the State Legislative Assembly that
some 200,000 to 500,000 Keralites working in the Gulf are likely to
return home by mid 2009.
The Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, has undertaken four
large-scale migration surveys in Kerala during the last 10 years to estimate
the number of emigrants, return emigrants and remittances. The latest
survey was conducted in 200819 and it was revisited in 200920  to arrive
at reliable estimates of return emigrants due to the crisis. All those in the
original sample who had returned were asked to cite the reasons for
returning to Kerala. The questionnaire provided ten possible reasons for
return, among which the following three could be attributed to recession:
job loss and return due to financial crisis, expiry of contract (renewal of
contract did not take place as expected due to recession), and compulsory
expatriation. The estimates of return migrants due to the crisis are provided
in Table 13.
Table 13. Number of Return Emigrants to Kerala due to Recession
in 2009
Sample Kerala
Total Emigrants in 2008 based on 2008
Kerala Migration Survey 3953 2193412
Return emigrants among emigrants of 2008 in
Return Migration Survey in 2009 304 168681
Return Emigrants to Kerala due to financial
crisis and recession 110 61036
Source: Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan, 2010b
If we deduce that out of the stock of 2.19 million emigrants from
Kerala, about 61,036 crisis-led migrants returned, then what could be
the number of return emigrants from the Gulf to South Asia? According
to the database available from various sources (both formal and informal),
we arrived at a figure of 9.5 million South Asian emigrants in the Gulf;
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and the projected return emigrants from the Gulf region to South Asia at
about 263,66021. The country-wise estimates of return emigrants are
provided in Table 14. India registered the highest number of return
emigrants due to the crisis (140,000), followed by Pakistan (64,000),
Bangladesh (25,000), Sri Lanka (27,000) and Nepal (7,000). One can
also estimate the number of return emigrants from the countries of
destination in the Gulf to countries in South Asia. For instance, India
had a stock of 1.7 million migrants settled in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE); and in the projected number of return emigrants from the UAE,
there were 47,000 Indians.
Table 14. Estimates of Return Emigrants to South Asia from the Gulf
due to Financial Crisis, 2009
Country       Stock of Emigrants Return Emigrants
due to crisis
Kerala 2193412 61036
India 5050000 140526
Pakistan 2300000 64002
Bangladesh 900000 25044
Nepal 250000 6957
Sri Lanka 975000 27131
South Asia 9475000 263660
Why is the estimate of return emigrants small in comparison with
the predicted number of Gulf returnees to South Asia? The senior
researcher postulated two important features of Gulf migration from
South Asia as responsible for this22. They are: 1. the cost of migration to
the Gulf and 2. the peculiarities of the channel of migration. South
Asians incur huge costs to migrate to the Gulf. According to the Kerala
Migration Survey 2008, the cost of migration to the Gulf varied between
Rs. 53,951 to Kuwait to Rs.74,606 to Saudi Arabia - between USD 1200
and 1660 at an exchange rate of Rs. 45 per US Dollar (Table 15). This
applies to all the South Asian countries (also see United Nations, 2009;
Zachariah and Rajan, 2010a; Rajan and Prakash, 2009).
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Table 15.Average cost of Emigration for different Migration
Corridors from Kerala to the Gulf, 2008
Countries Average cost (Rupees)
Kerala-Bahrain 57172
Kerala-Kuwait 53951
Kerala-Oman 56840
Kerala-Qatar 66316
Kerala-Saudi Arabia 74606
Kerala-UAE 61308
Source: Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan, 2010a
Table 16.  Sources of Finances for Emigration, 2008
Source      Per cent  of Emigrants
From Family Members 26.8
Personal Savings 40.1
Parents Savings 37.7
Borrow from Friends 42.1
Loans  from money lender 12.6
Loans from Banks 14.1
Sale/Mortgage of Land 4.9
Sale/Mortgage of Other Assets 3.4
Sale/pledge Ornaments 29.2
Government Assistance 0.4
Others 7.0
*The total exceeds 100 as emigrants use more than one source.
 Source:  Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan, 2010a
The high cost of migration to the Gulf caused many emigrants to
borrow money from various financial sources, including moneylenders
and to obtain cash from the sale of assets such as land and gold ornaments
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(for details, see Table 16). Under such conditions, even if the expatriates
lost their jobs in the Gulf, they would prefer not to return home fearing
inability to repay the debt already contracted there. They would rather
accept any job at a lower wage and try to continue to send home
remittances to repay their loans even during a crisis in the destination
country.
Another characteristic of South Asian migration to Gulf is the part
played by the social network, which consists of friends and relatives,
who perform a major role in the channel of migration flows by arranging
visas and other requirements for the emigration process. For instance, an
all-India survey conducted by the Centre for Development Studies for
the International Labour Organization and the Ministry of Overseas
Indian Affairs revealed that close to 80 per cent of Indian emigrants
utilised their friends and relatives as an important channel for migration
(Table 17). This also ensured that in the event of a job loss, they could
rely on someone to provide them temporary support.
Table 17.  Channels of Migration by Emigrants, 2007
Channel Male Female Total Male Female Total
Friends and relatives 330 185 515 74.2 88.52 78.7
Government agency 3 0 3 0.7 0.00 0.5
Foreign employer 41 7 48 9.2 3.35 7.3
Private Recruitment
Agencies 71 17 88 16.01 8.1 13.5
Total 445 209 654 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar, 2009; 2010
These features of South Asian migration (cost and social network)
has minimised the extent of return emigration during this time of financial
crisis.
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Lost Jobs in the Gulf and have not returned to the Country of Origin
So there is a category of migrants who have ‘lost jobs in the gulf
and have not returned to the country of origin’.  One of the strategies
adopted by the emigrants who lost their jobs in the countries of destination
due to the financial meltdown is to return to their countries of origin and
look for employment. As we have seen in the earlier section, some of
those who returned home after having lost their jobs in the Gulf are still
unemployed and looking for jobs. The Nepal Government has announced
an incentive package to help such return emigrants. However, there is an
equal number or more persons who lost their jobs and are still not able to
return due to the heavy investment they incurred in order to migrate.
This class of emigrants remain unemployed in the destination
country and continue to look for jobs in the sectors which are less/not
affected by the crisis, and are ready to work even for lower wages than
what they were previously receiving and under hostile working
conditions. The Return Emigrant Survey 2009 conducted in Kerala
offered a unique opportunity to estimate the number of those who lost
their jobs in the Gulf countries due to the crisis there. According to the
estimate made by the authors, of the 2.2 million stock of emigrants from
Kerala, about 39,396 persons lost their jobs between 2008 and 2009 but
have not returned to their country of origin (Zachariah and Rajan, 2010).
Table 18. Estimates of Emigrants who lost job in the Gulf but have
not returned, to South Asia, 2009
Country Stock of Emigrants Number lost job but not
 returned
Kerala 2193412 39396
India 5050000 90703
Pakistan 2300000 41310
Bangladesh 900000 16165
Nepal 250000 4490
Sri Lanka 975000 17512
South Asia 9475000 170181
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Applying the same methodology to estimate the number of South
Asian migrants who lost their jobs in the Gulf, but had not returned to
the country of origin is placed at 170,181.  This total comprise of Indians
(90,000), followed by Pakistanis (41,000), Bangladeshis (16,000),
Nepalese (5,000) and Sri Lankans (18,000). How these workers cope
with their shattered livelihood in the destination countries requires
separate investigation.
We have briefly attempted to review the coping mechanism of
Gulf job-deprived return migrants in their respective countries of origin.
8.2  Outflow of workers from South Asia to Gulf, 2009
As there was no official data to show the extent of the crisis-led
return emigration from the Gulf to South Asia, we estimated the possible
trends in the number of return emigrants. However, South Asian countries
have reasonably well-managed data base on the flow of workers from
their respective countries to the country of destination. Evidence
gathered from the five country reports prepared for this research clearly
indicates a decline in the outflow of workers from South Asia to the Gulf
in 2009. According to the projections made by the authors of the report
based on the actual data available for the last seven to eights months of
2009, all countries in South Asia, except Sri Lanka, have reported decline
in the flow of workers to the Gulf. The projected decline for India is
huge – about 280,000 – followed by Pakistan with just 12,000 (See
Table 19).
Evidence available from all the countries in South Asia indicate
that the number of workers going to the Gulf declined the most in case
of the UAE, which has been more severely affected by the crisis than the
other countries in the Gulf. For instance, in 2008, 349,827 Emigration
Clearance Required (ECR) passport holders left for the UAE for work
from India; and their number had declined to just 75,000 in September
2009. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia attracted about 228,406 persons
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in 2008; and as of September 2009, 214,043 had already left for Saudi
Arabia. This pattern holds true for Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal also.
Thus the recession has changed the migration and demographic dynamics
of South Asian workers in the Gulf region.
8.3  Inward Remittances to South Asia, 2009
The money that migrants send home is important not only to their
families, but also to their country’s balance of payments. In many
developing countries, remittances represent a significant proportion of
the gross domestic product (GDP) as well as foreign exchange earning.
Table 19. Outflow of Migrant Workers from South Asia to Gulf, 2005-09
India Pakistan Bangladesh Nepal Sri Lanka
2005 454628 127810 207089 88230 192004
2006 618286 172837 307620 128306 170049
2007 770510 278631 483757 182870 188365
2008 818315 419842 643424 169510 215793
2009* 538090 407077 N.A. 152272 226299
Source: This table is based on the country papers prepared by the
respective country team at the countries of origin for this project.
* Projected by the authors of this report based on the 2009 available
data.
India: Actual data available for January-September 2009; Pakistan:
Actual data available data for January-July 2009; Nepal: Actual data
available for January to September 2009; Sri Lanka: Actual data available
for January to August 2009.
Table 20. Outflow of Migrant Workers from South Asia, 2008-09
India Pakistan * Bangladesh Nepal Sri Lanka #
2008 N.A 246361 N.A N.A 145722
2009 N.A 237462 N.A N.A 150866
Change N.A - 8899 N.A N.A + 5144
Note: * January-July; # January-August
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In 2009, the World Bank published the list of 10 developing countries
(Table 21) with the volume of remittances and remittances as percentage
of the GDP. (World Bank, 2009) Among the South Asian countries under
study, India was ranked number one in terms of the volume of remittances
with US$ 52 billion in 2008 which is the equivalent of 4.2 per cent of
the gross domestic product. Bangladesh ranked eighth among the first
ten countries with US$ 9 billion. Pakistan, another Asian country with
US$ 7 billion ranked as 11th in terms of remittances.  On the other hand,
Nepal is being listed as one of the top 10 countries with the highest
share of remittances to the GDP at 22 per cent. Table 21 also illustrates
the importance of remittances to other South Asian countries such as
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the State of Kerala in India.
When the crisis hit in 2008, most of the concerned public were
more worried about the remittance flows rather than the migration flows.
In November 11, 2008, the World Bank (2008) stated, “The outlook for
remittances for the rest of 2008 and 2009-10 remains as uncertain as the
outlook for global growth, oil and non-oil commodity prices, and
currency exchange rates.” After several years of strong growth, remittance
flows to developing countries began to slow down significantly in the
third quarter of 2008 in response to a deepening global financial crisis.
Based on the World Bank’s economic projections for 2008-10 and
available monthly and quarterly data on remittances for January-August
2008, we estimated that remittance flows to developing countries would
reach US$ 283 billion in 2008 compared to a revised US$ 265 billion in
2007. World Bank (2009) argued that “remittance growth was expected
to be moderately significant, but that flow would remain resilient”. This
assessment was a relief to several economists, at least in the South Asian
context.
In late 2008, the Government of Kerala, India requested the Centre
for Development Studies to prepare a report on the Global Financial
Crisis and Kerala Economy: Impact and Mitigation Measures.
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Remittances have played an important role in Kerala’s development.
Remittances are also one of the channels through which the crisis could
affect the economy (Centre for Development Studies, 2008). The report23
predicted that the remittances to Kerala were expected to increase from
Rs.30.122 crores in 2007 to Rs.42.917 crores in 2008. Both the World
Bank and CDS reports are milestones in the context of the financial
crisis and remittances because both predicted that the inflows of
remittances to South Asia and Kerala were likely to continue, when the
general expectation was that it would drastically fall (Irudaya Rajan
and Zachariah, 2010a; 2010b).
Table 21.  Top 10 Remittance-Receiving Countries, 2008
Rank Countries (US $ billions) Percentage to GDP
1 India 52 4.2
2 China 49 1.1
3 Mexico 26 2.4
4 Philippines 19 11.2
5 Poland 11 2.0
6 Nigeria 10 4.7
7 Romania 9 4.7
8 Bangladesh 9 11.4
9 Egypt 9 5.3
10 Vietnam 7 7.9
Pakistan 7 4.2
Nepal 3 21.6
Sri Lanka 3 7.2
Kerala State, India 10.4 30.7
Source: World Bank. 2009. Migration and Remittance Trends 2009: A
better-than-expected outcome so far, but significant risks ahead.
Migration and Development Brief 11, Migration and
Remittances Team, Development Prospects Group, World Bank;
Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan. 2010a. Migration Monitoring
Study, 2008: Emigration and Remittances in the Context of
Surge in Oil Prices. CDS, Kerala.
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Table 22. Inward Remittances to South Asian Countries from Migrant
Workers, 2000-09
India Pakistan Bangladesh Nepal Sri Lanka
US $ (Millions)
2000 12890 1075 1968 111 1166
2001 14273 1461 2105 147 1185
2002 15736 3554 2858 678 1309
2003 20999 3964 3192 771 1438
2004 18750 3945 3584 823 1590
2005 22125 4280 4314 1212 1991
2006 28334 5121 5428 1453 2185
2007 37217 5998 6562 1734 2527
2008 51581 7039 8995 2727 2947
2009  * 47000 8619 10431 3010 2892
2009   + 53227 8856 10525 2812 3308
Percentage Change
2000-01 10.73 35.91 6.96 32.43 1.63
2001-02 10.25 143.26 35.77 361.22 10.46
2002-03 33.45 11.54 11.69 13.72 9.85
2003-04 -10.71 -0.48 12.28 6.74 10.57
2004-05 18.00 8.49 20.37 47.27 25.22
2005-06 28.06 19.65 25.82 19.88 9.74
2006-07 31.35 17.13 20.89 19.34 15.65
2007-08 38.60 17.36 37.08 57.27 16.62
2008-09 * -8.88 22.45 15.96 10.38 -1.87
2008-09 + 3.19 25.81 17.01 3.12 12.25
Source: World Bank and the country reports prepared by the research
team for this project from five countries of South Asia.
* World Bank Estimates +  Our estimates
Almost a year has passed since these estimates were made. Let us
assess the trends in remittances to the South Asian countries since 2000
to examine the growth of remittances (Table 22). The remittance growth
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during 2007-08 was extremely high for India, Bangladesh and Nepal,
with Nepal registering the highest growth at 57.27 per cent. Based on
the existing monthly data available for the South Asian countries, the
World Bank (2009) predicted that remittances in Pakistan, Bangladesh
and Nepal are expected to register growth, ranging from 22 per cent in
Pakistan to 10 per cent in Nepal. Our estimates based on the simple
average of remittances for the available months from the country reports
prepared by the teams suggests that all the countries of South Asia are
resilient to the crisis in terms of remittances. Our estimates put the growth
in remittances to India at 3 per cent, from US$ 52 billion in 2008 to US$
53 billion in 2009.
Table 23. Inflow of Worker’s Remittances to South Asia, 2008-09
 (US $ Million)
India Pakistan * Bangladesh*  Nepal * Sri Lanka #
2008 26723 5731 6811 1654 2249
2009 23558 7380 7894 1875 2481
Change - 3165 +1649 +1083 +221 +232
Source: Same as Table 22
Reference periods: Bangladesh: January-September; Pakistan: January-
October; Nepal: January-August; Sri Lanka: January –September and
India: January-June.
On November 3, 2009, the World Bank (2009) released a new
report ‘Migration and Remittances Trends 2009’ which said that the
outcomes were better than expected so far, but that there are significant
risks ahead. Remittance flows to South Asia grew strongly in 2008
despite the global economic crisis, but now there are risks that they may
slow down in a lagged response to a weak global economy. Why did
remittances not decline in South Asia? From our study, the following six
observations can be made: (a) the debts contracted to meet the high cost
incurred during their migration which remained unpaid kept the
emigrants from returning to the countries of origin in spite the lay offs at
the countries of destination; (b) the predictions of a large exodus of
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return emigrants from Gulf did not come true;  (c) though the outflow
declined in the first half of 2009, it has still not significantly affected
the stock of South Asian migrants in the Gulf; (d) the appreciation of the
US dollar vis-à-vis South Asian currencies; for instance, the current
exchange rate of the Indian rupee to the US dollar is same as in  2001-
02; (e) the continuous rise in oil prices generating more income in the
Gulf; and (f) the “reverse migration” of the crisis-led return emigrants
back to the Gulf (as indicated by our quick field work in India).
8.4  Outward remittances from the Gulf
Another way to assess the inflow of remittances to South Asia is to
analyse the outflow of remittances from the Gulf countries. The World
Bank (2009) could provide data only for 2008 for four countries in the
Gulf – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Even the World Bank
could not obtain any information on outward remittances for the UAE
and Qatar.
Table: 24. Outflows of Remittances from Gulf, 2001-08 (USD Million)
Saudi Arabia Oman Bahrain Kuwait
2001 15120 1532 1287 1784
2002 15854 1602 872 1925
2003 14783 1672 1082 2144
2004 13555 1826 1120 2403
2005 13996 2257 1223 2648
2006 15611 2788 1531 3183
2007 16068 3670 1483 3824
2008 16068 5181 1483 3824
Source:  World Bank, 2009: Information for United Arab Emirates and
Qatar are not available
Until 2008, the outflows of remittances from the Gulf were on the
increase in all countries, except Bahrain.
58
8.5      Emigrant Household Survey Results from South Asia
As discussed earlier in the methodology section, this survey was
conducted in five countries of South Asia among the households which
have an emigrant currently in the Gulf in order to examine their coping
mechanisms, if any, at the time of the crisis. The survey was canvassed
among 452 households in five countries of South Asia. We shall briefly
discuss a few aspects of the analysis for this report24.  A few of the
surveyed households have more than one emigrant, thus taking the
total number of emigrants to 482 in 452 households.  The average
household size or emigrant support ratio is 3.8 persons per household.
Only 5 per cent of households have women emigrants. About 85 per
cent of emigrants went abroad on proper worker visas, while others went
on visit visas, tourist visas, free visas and so on.
Families of poorer sections which have made huge investments to
send one member abroad will not be able to make migration the path to
their social mobility. Our survey indicates that about 75 per cent of the
households with migrants own land, 85 per cent own houses, 50 per cent
own refrigerators and 57 per cent own video recorders. Similarly, one-
fourth of households have drinking water within their premises, 40 per
cent use their own well or tube well and almost half of the households
use LPG for cooking.
94 per cent of the households reported receiving regular
remittances even during the crisis period; and about 30 per cent of the
households also received gifts from emigrants. To assess the utilisation
pattern of remittances, we asked the household members staying behind
in the home country to list the uses to which remittances are expended
in order of importance (Table 25). The results indicate that there is no
major change in their expenditure pattern during 2008-2009, and in
fact, households were prudent in their use of remittances, devoting
relatively larger sums of money to saving and investment. Table 25 also
provides the general pattern of use of remittances in South Asia. About
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90 per cent of households reported the use of remittances (in order of
importance) as follows: day-to-day expenses, investment in human
development (education and health), general savings and saving for
construction of a house. About 61 per cent of the families reported the
repayment debts related to the cost of the migration as one of the chief
uses of remittances.  It was found that the economic crisis had no impact
on emigrant households’ use of remittances.
To a query on their current job status in the host country, 13 per cent
of the emigrants households reported that their breadwinner had lost their
jobs due to the financial crisis since 2008 Among them, half had found
another job and stayed on the countries of destination; one fourth had
changed their sponsors; and another one fourth had continued to stay on
illegally in the Gulf. Interestingly, about 40 per cent of the households
reported   that their emigrant members planned to return home soon.
When we enquired about the employment scenario in their work
place at the time of the crisis, 25 per cent of the emigrants reported that there
were large scale redundancies at their companies, 16 per cent reported that
contracts were postponed/cancelled, 20 per cent reported that wages were
reduced or not paid, 17 per cent reported that heavier workload was imposed
with the same or lower wages, 8 per cent reported that they were forced to
take annual leave and another 10 per cent reported that there were shortfalls
in provisions of food, shelter or health care by their employers.
We were also keen on assessing the household expenditure on
various items during the time of crisis as compared to pre-crisis situation
among emigrant households. Six out of ten households reported no
change in the pattern of household expenditure. Among those households
who reported changes in the expenditure pattern (178 out of the 452
households) during the crisis, we asked them to provide feedback as
follows: (a) Increase (b) Decrease, and (c) Not much change (Table 26).
Only 8 per cent of emigrant households reported decline in their
household expenditure on food and clothing, 5 per cent each reported
61
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decline in expenditure on education and health respectively, and 10 per
cent said that expenditure on construction of houses had to be cut down.
On the financial commitments and repayment status during 2008
and 2009, we found that among the surveyed households, there were
only seven defaulters in 2008. And they continued to be defaulters in
2009 also. There was no change in the financial commitment among the
emigrant households during the time of the crisis (Table 27).
Table 28. Postponement of the Pattern of Investment among Emigrant
Households in South Asia, 2009
Investment pattern Number Percent
Land 54 11.9
House 48 10.6
Insurance 18 4.0
New/Existing Business Ventures 17 3.8
Building/construction/Renovation/
Maintenance 85 18.8
Private Investment Schemes 9 2.0
Bank Deposits 74 16.4
Others 5 1.1
Source: Same as Table 25.
Looking at the patterns of investment, it was found that about 12
per cent of the households had postponed their investment in land or
houses, about 19 per cent had put off construction activities on their
houses and about 17 per cent had postponed depositing money in the
bank. Following the crisis, three out of four households had taken some
kind of loan to supplement the household income. One of out of ten
households had borrowed money from their friends and relatives. On
the use of the borrowed funds, it was found that 42 per cent used them
for routine household expenses, 23 per cent for human development
(health and education) and another 18 per cent for meeting financial
64
commitments (Table 29). In one out of 10 households, members left
behind in the countries of origin had taken up a new jobs/employment
to supplement the income due to the crisis.
The survey also enquired about a few selected events that had
taken place in the households since the crisis and tried to find out how
many of them were due to financial crisis. Just 19 households shifted the
residence since the crisis and only five cited the reason for moving
house as the financial crisis. Similarly, only 27 households reported that
their children ‘dropped out’ or ‘moved school or college’ since the crisis
and among them only 17 attributed this to be due to the crisis. A number
of households postponed realistically their life course events such as
marriage (25) due to the crisis, 49 households postponed the medical
treatment of one of the household members and 22 households
postponed medical checkup of a family member.
Did any of the households sell their existing assets to cope with
the decline of remittances from their emigrant members abroad? It was
found that during the crisis just two households closed their fixed
deposits, one household sold land, seven households sold jewelry, two
households sold personal vehicles and 35 households sold their livestock.
When assessing the impact of the financial crisis, most researchers
do not attempt to evaluate the psychological stress suffered by the
emigrant members and by their household members left behind25. The
research team at the Centre for Development Studies assigned five
questions to assess the psychological impact including anxiety and
stress among emigrant households. The answers to these questions are
presented in Table 30. About 70 per cent of the left behind members of
the emigrant households felt that it would be difficult for them to manage
the financial affairs of the household, if their emigrant member did
return due to crisis. Similarly, one out of two households reported that
they faced the imminent threat of their emigrant member losing his/her
job. About one out of four emigrant members reported changes in their
health status following the crisis.
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Table 31. Reported Morbidity Patterns among Emigrants and
Women Members Left Behind in South Asia, 2009 (out of
the 452 emigrant households contacted)
 Emigrant member Descending Women left Descending
 order (first 5) behind  order (first 5)
Headaches 45 Fevers 52
High Blood Pressure 27 High Blood Pressure 33
Anxiety/depression 3 Headaches 31
Sleeplessness 4 Anxiety/depression 17
Weight loss 5 Gastrointestinal
problems 10
Among the morbidity problems reported, headaches, anxiety/
depression and high blood pressure have emerged as important ailments
faced by emigrant members and women members left behind.
Sleeplessness and weight loss are also the problems reported among
emigrant members.
8.6   Return Emigrant Household Survey results from South Asia
This survey was conducted among the return emigrants who lost
their jobs because of the financial crisis in the Gulf and were forced to
return home. The survey aimed at examining their coping mechanisms
after return. The survey was canvassed on various issues connected to
the crisis among 425 return emigrants in the five countries of origin.
Among the emigrants, 22 were female. A few important findings from
the survey26 are discussed below.
We were interested in assessing the livelihood options
(employment patterns) of the return emigrants at various points of time:
more than six months and less than one year prior to return; six months
prior to return; two weeks prior to return; at the time of our survey; and
one month after return. First, we assess the employment status and pattern
of employment among return emigrants at the time of survey, and within
one month after return. Among the return emigrants, about 73 per cent
68
remained unemployed even one month after their return, while the
remaining 27 per cent managed to find employment as regular wage
workers and as casual wage labourers or become self employed. However,
at the time of survey, the proportion of unemployed among the return
emigrants declined from 73 per cent to 42 per cent. Among the employed,
about 37 per cent managed to find regular employment, whereas casual
and contract workers constituted 40 per cent and 8 per cent of the workers
respectively at the time of the survey.
Table 32. Employment Status and Type of Employment among
Return Emigrants in South Asia at the time of Survey and
one month after their forceful Return, 2009
Employment status Present One month Present One month
status  after return  status %  after
return%
Self Employed 86 39 20.24 9.18
Regular salary/wage
employment 63 17 14.82 4.00
Casual wage labour 66 15 15.53 3.53
Unemployed 179 310 42.12 72.94
Others 31 44 7.29 10.35
Employment type
Regular 80 26 36.70 35.62
On contract 18 2 8.26 2.74
Casual 86 27 39.45 36.99
Others 29 15 13.30 20.55
The prevalence of unemployment among return emigrants
immediately after return from the countries of destination and at the
time of the survey indicates that such persons did not get any support
from either the Government or any banking institution. At the time of
the survey, about half of the return emigrants lived by making use of
their past savings, followed by borrowing and support from other members
of the family.
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Table 33. Coping with Unemployment after Return by Return
Migrants in South Asia, 2009
Present One month Present One month
 status  after return  status  after return
Lived in Past
savings 73 126 48.67 62.07
Borrowed to
stay on 52 40 34.67 19.70
Depended other
earning members
of the household 25 37 16.67 18.23
We have also collected information on the reasons for return among
the return emigrants who were self-employed, in regular salary
employment or unemployed in the destination countries two weeks
prior to return. Out of the 425 return emigrants surveyed, 221 had jobs
in the regular category and 144 were unemployed two weeks prior to
return. Let us assess the reasons behind the return of the regular category
of workers. About 52 per cent of them returned because their employer
terminated the contract. Another 40 per cent were forced to leave the
country on a long leave, while about 34-37 per cent left due to reduced
wages and change of contract, followed by change of sponsor.
The return emigrant survey also indicates that some of them were
unemployed two weeks prior to return. Some probably lost jobs and
became unemployed and were looking for a job but failed to land one
and returned to the country of origin. There were also cases where a
worker had arrived in the Gulf on a visit visa during the boom period,
then acquired a job and converted his/her visit visa to an employment
visa. However, due to the crisis, the opportunities to avail such jobs
could be getting limited in the Gulf so those visitors have to return.
About 54 per cent of the emigrants felt that they would get a job with a
salary lower than expected; about 45 per cent left the countries of
destination because they could not get the job in the preferred sector
and another 33 per cent left because they felt that they would not get
any job in the near future.
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One out of four return emigrants took loans to supplement the
family income; half of such borrowers depended on friends and relatives
and 7 per cent took loans from the professional money lenders. This
again indicates that the emigrants were not from very poor families as
they could mobilise the funds needed for the migration process. Half of
the loans were used for human development (education and health) and
the next most notable purpose of the loans was for routine household
expenses.
Table 37.  Adaptation of the Households after return of the emigrants
to South Asia from the Gulf, 2009
Event due to Percent to
 reported  financial total
crisis  households
The household has shifted residence 16 12 2.82
Any children in dropped out/
moved school/college 32 24 5.65
Postponement/cancellation of a
life course event 59 51 12.00
Postponement/cancellation of a trip/
vacation by non-emigrant members 55 50 11.76
Postponement/cancellation of
routine medical checkups for
any of the household 15 12 2.82
Postponement/cancellation of
medical treatment for any of the
household 49 36 8.47
Postponement/cancellation of
the proposed emigration by an
household member 25 14 3.29
The survey also made enquiries about the adaptation and coping
mechanisms employed by the return emigrant households to cover the
loss of remittances. About 2 per cent of households shifted residence
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due to the crisis, 12 per cent postponed their life course events, 11 per
cent postponed/cancelled their vacation, 13 per cent postponed their
medical check-ups or treatment and finally, about 3 per cent postponed
the proposed emigration plan of another household member.
Table 38. Position of Assets among Return Emigrant Households in
South Asia, 2009
Asset Owned Percent to Assets Percent to
 total sold  owned
households  households
Savings 354 83.29 12 3.39
Land 364 85.65 10 2.75
House 383 90.12 3 0.78
Company/business 298 70.12 2 0.67
Livestock 315 74.12 39 12.38
Consumer durables 384 90.35 9 2.34
Gold Jewellery 385 90.59 19 4.94
Vehicle 344 80.94 11 3.20
Other property 307 72.24 1 0.33
Among the return emigrant households, 86 per cent owned lands,
90 per cent owned houses, 90 per cent owned gold jewelry and 81 per
cent owned vehicles. Decline in  income and prolonged unemployment
in the countries of origin led 3 per cent of the return emigrants in South
Asia to sell their lands, 5 per cent to sell their gold and an overwhelming
12 per cent to sell their livestock.
8.7 Summing up of the Impact on Migrant Workers and Remittances
The unraveling of the impact of the crisis on output and
employment in the USA had generated an anticipation of large scale
retrenchment of expatriate labourers in the Gulf region. The anticipated
misery and the need for rehabilitation had got some governments in
South Asia thinking about plans for the returning migrants. But our
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‘survey of emigrants and return emigrants’ showed that the dimensions
of the impact were not as large as was feared earlier. For a stock of
approximately 9.5 million South Asian emigrants in the Gulf, the number
who returned due to the crisis was about 264,000 (just around 2.78%);
and the number who lost jobs but was continuing to stay in the Gulf was
about 170, 000 (1.80%).  Overall, less than 5% of the South Asian
emigrants had lost jobs owing to the crisis.  But such an impact had not
adversely affected the yearly flow of out-migrants from South Asia.
Compared to the outflow of about 2.2 million workers in 2008, the
number in 2009 is expected to be close to 2.0 million, which still is
higher than the corresponding figure in 2007.
As regards remittances (in USD), the annual percentage increase
since 2004-05 has been over 20% for the South Asian countries, except
for Sri Lanka. The magnitude of the increase has taken a hit all over
South Asia, except Pakistan from where the outflow of migrants had
been increasing at around 50% every year since 2005. But remittances
have not fallen following the crisis; either it has remained stagnant or
has shown a mild rise depending upon the estimates. As most of the
South Asian currencies have depreciated against the USD (to which the
GCC currencies are pegged) from late 2007, remittances in terms of
domestic currencies would have shown an increase. Survey of migrant
households in South Asia confirmed these estimates as 94% of the
households reported regular remittances during the crisis period also as
in previous years and no significant change in the use of remittances
was reported by these households.
Overall, less than 5% of the stock of South Asian migrants in the
Gulf had lost jobs and either returned back to home country or kept
struggling to continue in the Gulf. The flow of workers from South Asia
to the Gulf had also not been affected to any significant extent, but there
were changes in the origin (in favour of Pakistan) and the destination (in
favour of Saudi Arabia) of the flow. The volume of remittances into
South Asia had also not fallen to any significant extent.
76
The crisis, however, had affected the workforce in some decisive
ways. Those who returned home after losing jobs gave various reasons,
such as termination of contract, forced to take long leave, and contract
not renewed. A sizeable proportion reported reduced salary and benefits,
shift to another job, and deteriorating working and living conditions.
One out of four return emigrants had to take a loan to meet routine
household expenses, education and medical expenses, and other life
course expenses. Sale of assets, however, had not been a response to tide
over the period of unemployment and lack of earnings.
9. Policy Recommendations
Labour is one of the factors of production and all economic activity
is founded on it. As regards the GCC economies, and to a large extent in
Malaysia as well, labour is regarded as mobile as capital. Capital mobility
requires sound general accounting procedures, but the burden of any
form of accounting of labour mobility is put on the individual. The
countries of origin too are to blame for it. That is why the database on
migrant labour is weak and in the eventuality of a crisis, such as the
current one, the policy makers are in the dark about the numbers,
destinations, and skill base of the migrants to make any informed policy
interventions. It is time a sound database of migrants is built and regularly
updated.
Countries of destination often have restrictive visa regimes. This
does not allow enough time for migrants to plan their course of action
when they become unemployed. The labourer alone bearing the entire
burden of adjustment is unjust. The countries of destination should
allow a reasonable duration of stay for a labourer losing employment in
normal times and a longer duration in periods of crisis.
The labour receiving countries should avoid forced expulsion of
migrant workers. To ensure decent treatment of labour, they should
extend the inspection to sectors and work places where migrant workers
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are concentrated. They should discourage the managerial tendencies to
cut pay and to resort to exploitative and discriminatory practices.
Confiscation of passports and other documents and harassment of the
workers by the employers should be prevented at all times. Adequate
compensation should be paid to the workers who are forced to return
due to the economic crisis.
Despite rules prohibiting labour contractors from collecting the
cost of migration from the migrants, the practice goes on unhindered.
Especially high are the costs incurred by unskilled and poorly paid
labourers.  It is important that labour receiving countries should introduce
model labour contracts for various categories of workers, specifying the
details of wages and non-wage benefits to be paid. Then they should
take steps for their strict implementation. All the labour receiving
countries in the Gulf should fix the minimum wages and regulate other
working conditions like hours of work per day, paid holidays,
accommodation facilities, provision for medical treatment and return
journey travel cost.
Harassment, ill-treatment and sexual exploitation of the female
domestic workers by the employers should be treated as criminal acts;
and the civil courts should treat these cases at par with those involving
the other citizens of the labour-receiving country.  The labour redressal
machinery should contain special labour laws for all categories of female
workers such as domestic workers in the households, and skilled, semi-
skilled and unskilled female workers employed in establishments.
Some countries impose a tax on expatriate labourers. What they
fail to recognize is that competitive migration helps to keep wages low
in the destination countries which gives them competitive advantage in
product markets. Instead of rewarding the labour for such a gain, they
seem to be penalising them by taxing them. Further, the burden of social
security payments falls on the countries of origin, which do not reap the
gains of any production by these workers. It may be made mandatory for
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the labour receiving countries to make payments for social security
which should be distributed through the countries of origin.
The labour sending countries of South Asia and South East Asia
should form a union like OPEC to ensure that the labour receiving
countries implement minimum wages, zero cost of migration, decent
working conditions, labour laws to protect the workers and special laws
for female workers. The labour sending countries should collectively
take a decision not to allow workers to go to those countries which are
not prepared to fix a minimum wage and offer them decent working
conditions.
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Notes
1 Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries are: United Arab Emirates,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman.
2 The price of crude oil had declined to average of USD 50 per barrel,
compared to the baseline price of USD 75 in 2009.
3 Though the CDS has received a major grant from the Asian Development
Bank (RETA 6417) through the South Asian Network of Economic Institutes
(SANEI) via Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) in
Islamabad, additional grants and logistic support were received from the
Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), Research Unit on International
Migration at Centre for Development Studies, Department of Non-Resident
Keralite Affairs, Government of Kerala and the Ministry of External Affairs
of Government of India through their respective Indian Embassies in the
seven countries of destination – six countries in the Gulf and Malaysia.
4 The extension of the study to five South Asian Countries will lead us to
provide policy framework at the South Asian Association of Regional
Corporation (SAARC level). With the senior author’s experience in
conducting studies on aging issues in South Asia, migration research at this
juncture was extended to South Asian countries; see S. Irudaya Rajan (Ed).
2008. Social Policies for the Elderly: Experiences from South Asia.
Routledge; S. Irudaya Rajan, Carla Risseeuw and Myrtle Perera. 2008 (Eds).
Institutional Provisions and Care for the Aged: Perspectives from Asia and
Europe. Anthem Press.
5 The senior author has conducted earlier research in the countries of destination
(United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain) both for the Department of
Non-Resident Keralite Affairs, Government of Kerala and Ministry of
Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India; see details, K C Zachariah, B
A Prakash and S Irudaya Rajan. 2003; The Impact of Immigration Policy
on Indian Contract Migrants: The Case of the United Arab Emirates,
International Migration, Volume 41. No.4, Pp. 161-172; Zachariah, K C, B
A Prakash and S Irudaya Rajan, 2004; Indian Workers in UAE: Employment,
Wages and Working Conditions. Economic and Political Weekly, Volume
XXXIX, No. 22, May 29 2004, Pp.2227-2234; S. Irudaya Rajan, V.J.
Varghese and M.S. Jayakumar. 2009: Overseas Recruitment Practices in
India: A Critical Assessment. International Labour Organization and Ministry
of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India.
6 The preparation of country report was undertaken by a two member team
consisting of a professor and assistant professor from the Centre for
Development Studies, who made a one week trip to all the countries in the
Gulf with the logistic s support of the respective Indian Embassies in the
Gulf. They were supported by the research assistants both in the Gulf and in
India to prepare the country report and complete the emigrant survey. The
senior author of the report visited most of the Gulf countries and Malaysia
along with the team to gather the firsthand information on the crisis and its
impact on migrant workers. The country reports are available for circulation
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at the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala. With the growing interest on
the destination country reports of the Gulf, the Ministry of Overseas Indian
Affairs, Government of India, has agreed to sponsor an one day seminar at
the CDS to present the country reports in January 2010 and to later get the
report published by a leading publisher in India.
7 The report prepared by the five countries of origin – India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal – is available with the Centre for
Development Studies, Kerala. With a view to publicise the report, the
Secretary,  Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs has requested the senior
author of this report to organise a one-day workshop on “Dynamics of
Migration from South Asia in the context of Global Financial Crisis” at
Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, in March 2010.
8 Separate report based on the survey was prepared by S. Irudaya Rajan and
D. Narayana of the Centre for Development Studies.
9 In Qatar, the survey was facilitated by School of Foreign Service in Qatar of
the Georgetown University with the assistance of Dr. Ganesh Seshan.
10 Separate report based on the survey was prepared by S. Irudaya Rajan and
Arindam Banerjee of the Centre for Development Studies.
11 Separate report based on the survey was prepared by S Irudaya Rajan and
Vinoj Abraham of the Centre for Development Studies.
12 This survey was financed by the Department of Non-Resident Keralite
Affairs, Government of Kerala for the larger study on Impact on Global
Recession on return emigrants in Kerala. This report is being prepared by
K.C. Zachariah and S. Irudaya Rajan of the CDS. The preliminary report
will be available by late December 2009.
13 This section is based on the six country reports prepared by the research
team at the Centre for Development Studies. Most of the members of the
research team have already visited Gulf to assess the reality by talking to
several stake holders and additional research is done by the authors of this
report.
14 See country report.
15 GCC plus Algeria, Libya, and Sudan.
16 By a research consultant Dr. Janardhan based in UAE.
17 The stock of return emigrants in Kerala was about 0.7 million in 1998, and
increased to 0.9 million in 2003 and 1.2 million in 2008 (see Zachariah and
Irudaya Rajan, 2009).
18 According to the 2008 Kerala Migration Survey conducted by the Centre
for Development Studies, the emigrants from Kerala are estimated at 2.19
million (about 90 per cent live in the Gulf) and the remittances are estimated
at Rs. 43,288 crores. At present, Kerala leads the other states in India both in
terms of outward emigration and inward remittances (Zachariah and Irudaya
Rajan, 2009).
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19 The fourth Kerala Migration Survey (KMS, 2008) was conducted during
August-December 2008, covering 15,000 sample households throughout
the 63 taluks in Kerala. Out of 15,000 households, the survey enumerated
2,702 households with 3,981 emigrants. The KMS 2008 estimated the
stock of emigrants from Kerala as 21.9 million based on the following
method (more details, see Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan, 2009)
EMI (Emigrants) = [{sum of (Hi*ri/hi)}/Sum of Hi]*H
ri = Number of Emigrants in the sample households in the ith locality
hi= Number of sample HHs in the ith locality (50)
Hi = Total number of HHs in the sample locality (from Census)
H= Total number of HHs in the Taluk (from Census)
20 Return Emigrant Survey 2009 was conducted at the Centre for Development
Studies and sponsored by the Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs,
Government of Kerala (for more details of the survey report, see Zachariah
and Irudaya Rajan, 2009). The field work was carried out during 16 June –
7 September 2009.
21 These could be underestimates as the composition of migrants from Kerala
would have a lower proportion of unskilled workers.
22 Firstly, as organizer and participant in the Round Table Discussion on
Global Financial Crisis and Indian workers in the Gulf sponsored by the
Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India, held at Centre
for Development Studies on 3 February 2009. Secondly, as a organizer
and paper presenter at the International Conference on Effects of the
Global Financial Crisis in GCC Countries and its Impact on South And
South East Asian Migrant Workers during 21-22 July 2009 at Centre for
Development sponsored by the International Labour Organization, United
Nations Fund for Women and Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs,
Government of India.
23 The senior author of the report was a member of team which prepared the
report for the Government of Kerala. The remittances are projected to reach
between Rs. 38,492 crores (low estimate) to Rs.42,917 crores (high estimate)
(go to www.cds.edu for the full report); interestingly, the Kerala Migration
Survey 2008 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies for the
Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs has estimated the remittances
to Kerala in 2008 as Rs. 43,288 crores in 2009 (Zachariah and Irudaya
Rajan, 2009).
24 Separate report based on the survey was prepared by S. Irudaya Rajan and
Arindam Banerjee of the Centre for Development Studies.
25 The Centre for Development Studies has undertaken major research on
social and psychological impact of migration on left behind women, children
and elderly (Zachariah, Mathew and Irudaya Rajan, 2003).
26 Separate report based on the survey was prepared by S. Irudaya Rajan and
Vinoj Abraham of the Centre for Development Studies.
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